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The Effectiveness of Competing Regulatory Regimes and the Switching 
Effects? : Evidence from an Emerging Market. 
 
Hisham Farag
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Abstract 
I investigate the effectiveness of two competing regulatory regimes and the effect of switching 
from strict price limits to circuit breakers on volatility spillover, and also on trading 
interference hypotheses. I find that switching to the circuit breakers regime increases volatility 
and disrupts the price discovery mechanism. Stock prices are prevented from reaching their 
equilibrium levels and traders are unable to obtain their desired positions on limits hit day. 
Moreover, I find that volatility is spread out over the following two days post-limit hits within 
the strict price limits regime. Finally, results show that price limits interfere with trading 
activity and affect investors’ beliefs and liquidity positions.   
 
 
 
 
 JEL classification number: G15 
Key words: Price limits, circuit breakers, volatility and trading behaviour. 
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1. Introduction 
Price limits are regulatory tools in both equity and futures markets in which further trading 
is prevented for a pre-specified duration either across the whole market or for a particular 
stock - with the intention of cooling traders’ emotions and reducing price volatility2. Price 
limits have become very popular and are widely used by different stock exchanges over the 
world. Despite the popularity of price limits, there is a remarkable debate in the academic 
literature regarding the effectiveness of such regulatory tools and whether or not they actually 
cool down market sentiment and reduce price volatility as intended. Chan et al (2005) argue 
that price limits are the main reason for order imbalance. Subrahmanyam (1994) finds that 
imposing circuit breakers increases price volatility rather than cooling the volatility. Lee et al. 
(1994) argue that the announcement of trading halts leads to a dispersion of investors’ belief 
about the equilibrium prices, and thus some irrational traders are drawn to the market under 
the effect of excessive media coverage
3
. This results in an increase in both trading volume and 
volatility (Farag and Cressy, 2012). 
 
Price limits may also cause price volatility to spread out over a few days post-limit hits 
(volatility spillover hypothesis); see for example Fama (1989), Kim and Rhee (1997), Chen 
(1997), George and Hwang (1995), and Chen et al. (2005).  Moreover, it is argued that price 
limits prevent security prices from reaching their equilibrium levels, and disrupt the price 
discovery mechanism due to the suspension of trading for a period of time (Delayed price 
discovery hypothesis); see, for example, Fama (1989), Lehmann (1989), Lee et al. (1994), 
Kim and Rhee (1997) and Phylaktis et al. (1999). On the other hand, if trading is prevented by 
price limits then shares become less liquid, and this leads to intensive trading activity during 
the following trading days (trading interference hypothesis); see, for example, Fama (1989), 
                                                          
2
 Kim and Yang (2004) differentiate between three main categories of these regulatory tools, namely: price limits, 
firm-specific trading halts and market-wide circuit breakers. The trigger for price limits occurs when prices hit 
particular pre-specified price boundaries. With firm-specific trading halts, trading is ceased for a particular stock(s) 
for a given period of time within the session, or until the end of the trading session, if prices hit the predetermined 
limit. Finally, with market-wide circuit breakers, trading may be stopped - for a pre-specified duration – across the 
whole market if the market index hits a pre-determined level.   
3
 Lee et al. (1994) find that trading halts increase both trading volume and stock price volatility by 230% higher 
than the following non-halt control. They argue that the media coverage plays an important role in explaining the 
post-halt price behaviour due to the increase in the heterogeneity of investors’ beliefs. 
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Telser (1989), Lehmann (1989), Lauterbach and Ben-Zion (1993), Kim and Rhee (1997) and 
Corwin and Lipson (2000).  
 
The existing body of literature on price limits investigates narrow/strict price limits (5% -7%) 
in many stock exchanges e.g. Taiwan, Tokyo and Athens Stock Exchanges, Chen (1997), Kim 
and Rhee (1997), Phylaktis et al. (1999). The empirical findings of these papers are mixed, 
therefore we can’t really decide whether or not strict price limits decrease price volatility and 
cool down the market. No other studies – to the best of my knowledge - have investigated the 
potential effect of a switch from narrow price limits to wider limit bands.  I investigate, in the 
context of the Egyptian stock market, the effect of the changes in regulatory policies on three 
main hypotheses, namely (i) the volatility spillover hypothesis, (ii) the delayed price discovery 
hypothesis, (iii) and the trading interference hypothesis. In addition, the paper investigates the 
impact of regulatory policies on the dynamic relationship between trading volume and 
volatility.  
 
The literature on price limits investigates the above hypotheses only for stocks that hit and 
nearly hit their limits (0.90 of the upper and lower limit bands); see, for example, Kim and 
Rhee (1997) and Chen et al. (2005). However, no other studies – to the best of my knowledge 
-  have empirically investigated the relative efficiency of the alternative price limit regimes 
(circuit breakers/price limits). One of the compelling reasons for studying price limits in the 
context of the Egyptian stock exchange is that it is a unique example of the switch from strict 
price limits (SPL) (+/-5%) to circuit breakers (CB). The switch is accompanied by a move to 
much wider price limits (+/-10% - 20%). There are only a few stock exchanges throughout the 
world that have switched to a wider price limits, e.g. Thailand from 10% to 30%, and the 
Korean Stock Exchange from 6% to 15%. Therefore, there is an obvious policy implication as 
we can identify the effect of regime change to wider limit bands on price volatility and trading 
behavior. 
 
I find evidence – consistent with the volatility spillover hypothesis - that volatility is spread 
out over two days subsequent to limit hit day within the SPL regime. Moreover, the price 
discovery mechanism is disrupted when stocks experience greater volatility for a few days 
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post-limit hits and therefore stock prices are prevented from reaching their equilibrium levels. 
These deviations from the true prices are expected to prevail within the SPL regime as trading 
is suspended until the following day (trading session) when the prices hit their limits.  
However, within wider bands of limits followed by trading halts (CB), investors have a 
chance to adjust their portfolios’ position within the same trading session. These results are 
consistent with Kim and Rhee (1997) and Lee et al (1994). The results also show that price 
continuations behaviour occurs more frequently within the SPL regime; however price 
reversal behaviour seems to occur more frequently within the CB regime. Finally, the results 
of the trading interference hypothesis show that there is a sharp increase in trading activity on 
event day (limit hit day) for both SPL and CB regimes as traders are unable to obtain their 
desired positions. The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the 
institutional background of the Egyptian Stock Exchange (EGX). Section 3 presents details of 
the econometric modeling and the empirical results. A summary and conclusion is presented 
in the final section. 
2. The Institutional background of EGX 
The Egyptian Stock Exchange (EGX) has become one of the biggest and most promising 
emerging markets in the Middle East and North Africa region
4
, having grown substantially 
since the beginning of the Egyptian economic reform and privatisation program in the mid-
1990s. The Egyptian Stock Market achieved reasonable performance indicators during 2008-
2010 even though the negative impact of the global financial crisis that affected the vast 
majority of the stock markets throughout the world. It was classified by the Economist in 2010 
as one of the best six emerging markets (CIVETS)
5
 offering significant potential growth over 
the next decade. In addition, the World Federation of Exchanges’ (WFE) statistics in 2010 
reported that it had achieved an average gain of 15%, ahead of many leading world emerging 
stock exchanges e.g. China, Brazil, and Czech Republic, and ahead of all Arab stock markets 
except for Qatar (25%) and Casablanca (21%). The Standard and Poor’s S&P IFCI reported 
that the average growth rate for the EGX during 2010 was 13% in US$ compared with the 
average growth rate for other emerging markets (12%).  
                                                          
4 For more details see the World Federation of Exchanges (WFE) statistics. Some institutional factors, such as 
neither capital gain nor dividends are taxed ,distinguish the Egyptian stock market from other emerging markets. 
5
 Colombia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey and South Africa 
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The EGX has a unique history of price limit regimes; this makes studying it – (amongst  few 
other stock exchanges e.g. Korean and Thailand) - interesting. Since 1996, EGX trading 
regulations have imposed strict (+-5%) price limits (SPL) for all the listed shares. The limit is 
activated for a particular stock only when stock prices hit the upper or lower limit, at which 
point the trading on these shares is suspended to the end of the trading session.  In 2002 the 
regulator commenced a new price ceiling system, namely, circuit breakers (CB) in which the 
price limits have winded to +-20% for the most actively traded shares in the EGX. Within the 
new CB regime, trading is halted for 30 minutes when a particular stock price hits +-10%. 
During the 30-minute trading halt, brokers should inform their clients about the temporary 
suspension of the trading session. In addition they are allowed to cancel or adjust traders’ 
orders to adjust their portfolio positions. Trading is ceased only when prices hit their ceiling of 
+/- 20%.  
 
3. Data, Econometrics Modeling and empirical results 
The dataset consists of daily
6
 open, high, low and closing prices for all listed
7
 shares in the 
EGX over the period 1999-2010
8
. I use the EGX30 - a free-float market capitalization 
weighted market index
9
 as a benchmark. I also collect data on trading volumes and market 
capitalisation as a proxy for trading activity and size respectively. I define the event as being 
when a stock hits its upper or lower limits (+/-5%) within the SPL regime and when a stock 
hits its upper or lower limits (+/-10%) pre trading halts within the CB regime
10
. The total 
number of events is 4221 hits over the period 1999-2010 of which 1655 and 771 events are 
associated with +5% and +10% upper limit hits respectively. Whereas 1174 and 621 events 
are associated with -5% and -10% lower limit hits respectively. To investigate the volatility 
spillover, the delayed price reaction and the trading interference hypotheses, and to compare 
the switching effects from the SPL to the CB regime, I extend and augment the methodologies 
                                                          
6
 I adjusted the daily prices for dividends, stock dividends, and stock split. 
7
 The number of listed companies in 2010 is 211 companies. 
8
 I also estimate the three hypotheses over the period 1999-2005 so that the two windows (SPL and CB) are 
symmetric (4 years each) and to avoid any negative impact of the global financial crisis. I obtained similar results.  
9 I also used other equally weighted indices e.g. EFG as a benchmark and obtained similar results.  
10
 There are only a few events (prices hitting their ceiling (20%) post trading halts, therefore, I did not include 
these in the analysis. However, this will be investigated in a future extension of this paper.   
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of Fama (1989), Lauterbach and Ben-Zion (1993),   Kim and Rhee (1997) and Chen et al. 
(2005) using the augmented EGARCH model. 
 
3.1 Volatility Spillover hypothesis 
To investigate the Volatility Spillover (VS) hypothesis, for each event, I identify days 
(events) where the high price during the trading session matches its previous day's closing 
price plus the price limit band (-/+5%) or (-/+ 10%) for the SPL and CB regimes respectively. 
For the upper limits I assume:  
                    
)1(1 ttt PLBCH                                           (1) 
And for lower limits I assume: 
                  
)1(1 ttt PLBCL               (2) 
  Where:    
tH  
: is day's high price. 
tL  
: is day's low price. 
  1tC  : is previous day's closing price. 
         t
PLB
 
: is the price limit bands for day (t) (+/-5% or +/-10%) according to the regime in    
                  operation (SPL or CB). 
 
I define daily price volatility
11
 in the fashion of Kim and Rhee (1997) and Chen et al. (2005) 
as in equation 3: 
                
2
tjtj RV                                                          (3)
 
Where: 
tjV  is the volatility of stock (j) on day (t). tjR is the close-to-close return for stock j on 
day t, measured by  the log of the firm’s price ratio i.e. 1/ln  ttt PPR   where tP  is the closing 
price of the stock on day (t). I calculate the daily price volatility 
2
tjR  
for each stock in the four 
categories (upper and lower +/-5% or +/-10%) and then take the daily averages. I then 
estimate the volatility during 21 days (-10, +10) around event day. To overcome potential bias 
in volatility estimation I include only non-overlapping event windows. This reduces the 
sample size for the stocks that hits their limits by 19.2% (from 4221 to 3542).  I use the 
                                                          
11
 I also estimate daily volatility using the daily high-low range and obtained similar results. 
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nonparametric Wilcoxon signed–rank test to compare volatility levels for upper and lower 
limits. The null hypothesis is ''The distribution is centered on zero difference''. 
Chen et al. (2005) use the symmetric GARCH model to examine the effect of imposing price 
limits on price volatility in both the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. I argue that the 
asymmetric EGARCH model has many advantages over the symmetric GARCH as the 
estimation has no negative parameters ( 2log t  is positive), and so, no non-negativity 
constraints need to be imposed on the model parameters as in theTARCH-GJR model. To 
further investigate the effect of regime switch on price volatility, I estimate the Asymmetry 
Exponential GARCH model (EGARCH of Nelson, 1991) for the EGX30 market index over 
the period 1999-2010 and augment it by adding a price limit dummy variable as in equation 4. 
Leverage effect (the effect of positive and negative shocks on the future conditional volatility) 
is allowed, and the parameter   is expected to be negative in sign if the relationship between 
return and volatility is negative. The leverage effect in the EGARCH model is exponential 
rather than quadratic and can be tested by the hypothesis that 0 . The impact is asymmetric 
if 0 . The volatility persistence is measured by  to examine whether big (small) shocks 
are followed by bigger (smaller) shocks.  
          t
t
t
t
t
tt CB





 














2
)ln()ln(
2
1
1
2
1
12
1
2
                  (4) 
where: )ln( 2t  is the conditional variance of return at time (t), )ln(
2
1t : is the conditional 
variance at time (t-1), 














2
2
1
1
t
t
 is the effect of the shock (i.e. new information arrival) 
on conditional volatility, 
2
1
1


t
t


  is the effect of positive and negative shocks on conditional 
volatility (leverage effect) and tCB  is a dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the CB regime 
is in operation on day t; and zero if the SPL regime is in operation. The sign of   will be 
positive or negative as switching regimes increase or decrease volatility.  Nelson (1991) 
assumed that the error term follows the Generalized Error Distribution
12
 (GED).  
                                                          
12 I use the Berndt- Hall-Hall-Hausman (BHHH) technique to maximize the log likelihood function of the GED. 
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Table 1 presents the results of the volatility spillover hypothesis. Panel A shows that the 
highest volatility is reported on event day for both upper and lower limits for the two regimes. 
For the upper limit hits, for instance, we notice a large drop in volatility on day one from 2.5 
to 1.57 and from 10 to 0.81 for the SPL and CB regimes respectively. However, volatility 
drops from 2.5 to 1.28 and from 10 to 0.89 for the SPL and CB regimes respectively for the 
lower limit hits. Ma et al. (1989) explain this as the cooling effect of price limits; however 
Kim and Rhee (1997) and Lee et al. (1994) conclude that volatility measures will naturally 
decline when stocks hit their limits. We also notice that volatility within the CB regime is 
greater than those of the SPL except for the first two days post-upper limit hits and for the first 
day post-lower limit hits
13
.  This suggests that within the SPL regime, stocks that hit their 
upper and lower limit continue to experience greater volatility during the first 1-2 days post-
event compared with the CB regime. This result is consistent with the volatility spillover 
hypothesis. Moreover, the volatility post-limit hits are greater than those of the pre-limits for 
two and three days for the lower and upper limits respectively.  For example, within the upper 
SPL, post-limits volatility is greater than those of pre-limits by 286%, 377% and 82% 
respectively. Similarly, within the upper CB regime, post-limits volatility is greater than those 
of pre-limits by 45%, 127% and 47% respectively. Finally, the Wilcoxon signed–rank test 
shows that the differences between the two regimes are significantly different from zero at the 
0.01 and 0.05 levels on event day and over the first three days post-event
14
.  
 
Panel B presents the results of the augmented EGARCH model. The model is well specified 
as the log likelihood estimation is big  compared to the symmetric GARCH model
15
. This 
suggests that the EGARCH model fits the daily returns time series of the EGX30 and the 
temporal dependence of return volatility can be captured by the model.  
 
 
                                                          
13 Volatility within the upper SPL regime is greater than that of the CB regime by 93%, and 66% during the first 
two days post-event respectively. However, volatility within the lower SPL is greater than that of the CB regime 
by 43% on day one post-event. 
14
 To investigate the size effect on volatility within the two competing price limits regimes, I repeat the analysis of 
the volatility spillover hypothesis for two sub-samples, namely big and small companies based on their market 
capitalisation. I find similar results as those presented in Table 2; therefore, I conclude that there is no size effect 
on volatility spillover for the two regimes. The results are not presented but available from the author upon request. 
15
 The log likelihood estimation of GARCH model is 4964. 
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     Table 1 
     Volatility Spillover Hypothesis 
Panel A: Volatility Spillover Hypothesis 
Days 
           Upper limits           Lower limits  
+5%  +10% -5%  -10% 
-10 0.1768  0.1291 0.2200  0.2241 
-9 0.1653  0.2984 0.2190  0.2216 
-8 0.0827  0.2414 0.2813  0.2450 
-7 0.1095  0.2422 0.1933  0.2936 
-6 0.0957  0.2490 0.2071  0.3542 
-5 0.1349  0.2239 0.2373  0.2214 
-4 0.1110  0.2568 0.2398  0.2440 
-3 0.1333 < 0.2644 0.2430  0.3259 
-2 0.2667  0.3379 0.2541 < 0.4071 
-1 0.4072  0.5560 0.3694 << 0.6695 
0 2.5000 << 10.0000 2.5000 << 10.0000 
1 1.5723 >> 0.8088 1.2797 >> 0.8947 
2 1.2739 >> 0.7680 0.3649 < 0.4448 
3 0.2427 << 0.3895 0.2962 << 0.4770 
4 0.1107 < 0.2857 0.1309  0.2409 
5 0.1277  0.2572 0.1727  0.2115 
6 0.1586  0.2876 0.2138  0.2883 
7 0.1432  0.3813 0.1735  0.4051 
8 0.1745  0.3598 0.1752  0.2809 
9 0.1326  0.3249 0.1400  0.3169 
10 0.1343  0.2779 0.2005  0.2590 
Panel B: Augmented EGARCH estimation for EGX30 
   Coefficient SE   
    -0.4949*** (0.0704)   
    0.9686*** (0.0068)   
    -0.0281* (0.0167)   
    0.0371*** (0.0135)   
    0.0296** (0.0142)   
Log likelihood  5680    
Ljung-Box Q(20)  35.831    
Ljung-Box Q2(20) 
 
18.634  
 
 
LMARCH  1.1435    
The table presents the results of volatility spillover hypothesis for the two regimes as in equation 3. Volatility is 
measured by squared stock returns multiplied by 1000. >> and > implies that the left hand figure is significantly 
greater than the right hand figure at 0.01 and 0.05 significance levels respectively using Wilcoxon signed-ranked 
test. Panel B presents the results of the augmented Exponential Generalized autoregressive GARCH 
model as in equation 4. ***, **,* indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.  
 
The volatility persistence coefficients  and   are highly significant, however  is greater 
in magnitude than ; this implies that the bigger the market shocks the relatively smaller 
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expected volatility. The leverage effect is negative as expected; this suggests that negative 
shocks have greater impact on conditional volatility in the EGX. Most importantly, the CB 
coefficient  is positive in sign and highly significant; this suggests that the switch from SPL 
to CB increases future volatility. Furthermore, we can reject the null that the residuals are 
serially uncorrelated and homoskedastic as the results of the Ljung-Box Q(20) and Ljung-Box 
Q2(20) for serial correlation and the LMARCH(20) for heteroskedastisity are insignificant.  
Figure 1 presents the average price volatility for the upper limits for the two regimes around 
event day
16
. 
 
Figure I. Average price volatility for the upper limits for the two regimes  
 
To conclude, the results show that price limits do not decrease volatility as intended in both 
regimes (SPL and CB). However, volatility is found to be higher within the CB regime. On 
the other hand, within the SPL regime, volatility is spread out over two days subsequent to 
limit hit day. These results support the volatility spillover hypothesis in the Egyptian Stock 
Exchange and are consistent with findings of Kim and Rhee (1997), Lee et al (1994) and Chen 
et al. (2005).  
 
                                                          
16
 The figure of the average price volatility for the lower limits is pretty much similar to Figure 1. 
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3.2 The delayed price discovery hypothesis 
Stocks often experience either price continuation or price reversal based on overnight 
returns. I compare the price behaviour of the two regimes (SPL and CB), so that if price 
continuation behaviour within SPL is greater than that within the CB regime then we can infer 
that the efficient price discovery mechanism is much delayed within the SPL regime and the 
opposite is correct. Price continuation behaviour prevents stock prices from reaching their 
equilibrium levels, since otherwise we should observe price reversals or overreactive 
behaviour (Roll, 1983). Price limits interfere with the price discovery mechanism as trading 
usually ceases (when prices hit the limit) until the limits are revised. Therefore, at the limit-hit 
day these constraints (limits) prevent stock prices from reaching their equilibrium levels until 
the following trading day (session) (Fama, 1989, Lehmann, 1989, and Lee, Ready, and 
Seguin, 1994).  
 
According to the Delayed Price Discovery (DPD) hypothesis there will be positive overnight 
returns for stocks that hit their upper limits, and negative overnight returns for stocks that hit 
their lower limits. To investigate these claims I estimate the following two returns series 
following Kim and Rhee (1997) and Chen et al. (2005): namely open-to-close returns on the 
limit day, )/ln()( 0000 OCCOR   and close-to-open returns between the event day and the 
following day, )/ln()( 0110 COOCR  , where 0C is the closing price on day (t) and 1O  is the 
opening price on day (t+1). Stock returns can be positive, negative or zero; therefore, we have 
nine return series (+, +), (+, 0), (0, +), (0, -), (0. 0), (+, -), (-, +), (-, -) and (-, 0) as shown in 
Table 2. The first return symbol represents )( 00COR  and the second return symbol represents 
)( 10OCR . 
Table 2 
Classifications of price continuations and price reversals for the upper and lower limits 
 Upper Limits  Lower Limits  
Price continuation (+, +) and (0, +) (-, -) and (0, -) 
Price reversal (+, -), (0, -), (-, +), (-, 0) and (-, -) (-, +), (0, +), (+, -), (+, 0) and (+, +) 
No change (+,0) and (0,0) (-, 0) and (0, 0) 
Note:  The first return symbol represents the open-to-close returns on the limit day )/ln()( 0000 OCCOR   and the 
second return symbol represents the close-to-open )/ln()( 0110 COOCR   
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As can be seen from Table 2, I classify both (+, +) and (0, +) as price continuations for the 
upper limit hits. The (0, +) return series is classified as price continuation because these stocks 
experience an overnight price increase (stocks open at the upper limit and remain unchanged 
over the event day). The same concept applies to the lower limits as I classify both (-, -) and 
(0, -) return series as price continuations (Kim and Rhee, 1997, Chen et al., 2005, Bildikand 
Gulay, 2006). On the other hand, I classify (+, -), (0, -), (-, +), (-, 0) and (- , -) as price 
reversals for the upper limits. I also consider (-, +), (-, 0) and (-, -) returns series as price 
reversals because the first negative sign (open-to-close returns) implies price reversal before 
the end of the trading session on event day (Kim and Rhee, 1997, Chen et al., 2005). I also 
classify (-, +), (0, +), (+, -), (+, 0) and (+, +) as price reversals for the lower limits. Finally, I 
classify (+, 0) and (0, 0) as no-change category for the upper limits and the (-, 0) and (0, 0) as 
no-change category for the lower limits (Kim and Rhee, 1997, Bildik and Gulay, 2006). I use 
the standard nonparametric binomial Z-test to investigate the significant differences between 
the two regimes with respect to price continuations and price reversals following Kim and 
Rhee (1997) and Bildik and Gulay (2006). 
 
I estimate the proportions of price continuations, price reversals and no changes categories 
over the period 1999-2010 for the two regimes as in Table 3
17
. For the upper limits, Table 3 
shows that price continuations occur 74.7% and 51.04% of the time for the SPL and CB 
regimes respectively. However, price reversals occur 24.88% and 47.15% of the time for the 
SPL and CB regimes respectively over the same period. The no change events occur 0.42% 
and 0.81% of the time for the SPL and CB regimes respectively. For the lower limits, price 
continuations occur 69.15% and 47.58% of the time while price reversals occur 30.15% and 
52.40% of the time for the SPL and CB regimes respectively. Finally, the nonparametric 
binomial Z test shows that there is a significant difference between the two regimes regarding 
price continuations and price reversals.  
 
 
 
                                                          
17
 Following Kim and Rhee (1997) and Bildik, and Gulay (2006), consecutive event days are not excluded from the 
analysis as they will underestimate the frequencies of price continuation and price reversals. 
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Table 3 
 Proportions of price continuations and reversals for the SPL and CB regimes. 
Price Behaviour 
                Upper limits                Lower limits 
SPL 
(%) 
CB (%) SPL-CB 
(z- stat) 
SPL (%) CB (%) SPL-CB 
(z-stat) 
Price Continuation 74.70 51.04 5.7737*** 69.15 47.58 7.9097*** 
Price Reversal 24.88 47.15 -8.9936*** 30.15 52.40 -5.3111*** 
No. change 0.42 0.81 -1.2568 0.70 0.02 1.5987 
The table presents the limit hit frequencies for the two regimes namely SPL (strict price limits) and CB (circuit 
breakers).  
 
To summarise, the results show that price continuation behaviour occurs more frequently 
within the SPL regime. However, price reversal behaviour seems to occur more frequently 
within the CB regime. This implies that the price discovery mechanism is delayed by the SPL. 
This result supports the delayed price discovery hypothesis as price limits prevent stock prices 
from reaching their equilibrium levels, in particular within the SPL regime.  
 
3.3 The Trading Interference hypothesis. 
The Trading Interference (TI) hypothesis claims that trading volume (as a proxy for trading 
activity) will be higher for stocks that hit their upper or lower limits for a few days post-event 
(Lauterbach and Ben-Zion, 1993 and Bildik and Gulay, 2006). Fama (1989), Telser (1989), 
Lauterbach and Ben-Zion (1993) and Kim and Rhee (1997) claim that if trading is prevented 
by price limits, then shares become less liquid and this leads to intensive trading activity 
during the following trading days. Lehmann (1989) argues that order imbalances are corrected 
in the following days post-event as informed traders will wait until the prices reach their 
equilibrium levels.  As we expect that price limits will prevent rational trading on the event 
day, trading volume is therefore expected to continue increasing over the post-event days.  
 
To investigate the trading interference hypothesis around limit-days, following Kim and Rhee, 
(1997) and Chen et al. (2005), I calculate the percentage change in the turnover ratio for each 
stock in the two regimes as in Equations 5 and 6 and then take averages for each day over the 
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21- day window (-10, +10)
18
.  Table 4 presents the results of the trading interference 
hypothesis.  
 
                  
)/ln(% 1 jtjtjt TATATA                                                           (5)
 
                 
sharesofNoVolTA jtjt ./                                                       (6)
 
where:           
jtTA is the turnover ratio as a proxy for trading activity of stock (j) at time (t). 
                     
jtVol  is a daily trading volume for stock (j) at time (t). 
           
It is clear from Table 4 that there is a sharp increase in trading activity on event day for both 
the SPL and CB regimes. For the upper limits, Table 4 reports that the percentage increases in 
trading activity on event day are 51.26% and 77.03% for the SPL and CB regimes 
respectively. Moreover, trading activity on event day is significantly greater compared with 
the 10 days post- event. We also notice that the increase in trading activity lasts for two days 
(45.15% and 36.69%) post-event within the SPL, and lasts only for one day (40.50%) 
following the event within the CB regime. 
 
 For the lower limits, the highest trading activity – as expected – is reported on event day: 
42.84% and 67.15% for the SPL and CB regimes respectively. We also notice that the 
increase in trading activity lasts only for one day (24.89%) following the event within the SPL 
regime. However, we find a significant decrease in trading activity one day following the 
event within the CB regime. Finally, trading activity within the CB regime – on average – is 
higher than that of the SPL for four days pre-event for the upper and lower limits. 
 
I interpret the above results as follows: within the SPL regime, traders are unable to obtain 
their desired positions or to adjust their portfolios on event day and are forced to wait until the 
following trading session. On the other hand, within the CB regime, investors have the chance 
to adjust their portfolios during the same trading session
19
. However, not all investors are 
                                                          
18
 I exclude the consecutive events during the limit window (-10, +10) to be consistent with volatility spillover 
(VS) hypothesis analysis. 
19
 Greenwald and Stein (1988) and (1991) are the main proponents of trading halts. They argue that trading halts 
provide a suitable time for the dissemination of information between brokers and traders, so that large price 
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
15 
 
informed about the suspension of trading due to the lack of informational efficiency in 
emerging markets. Therefore, only one day following the event (in the case of upper limits) 
may be required to adjust the portfolios’ position.  This result suggests that price limits 
interfere with trading activity and affect the liquidity positions within the two regimes. These 
findings are consistent with Lehmann, (1989).  
 
     Table 4 
    Trading interference hypothesis: Turnover ratio 
Days 
         Upper limits          Lower limits  
+5%  +10% -5%  -10%  
-10 -0.0498  0.0227 -0.0380  0.0012 
-9 -0.0462  0.0249 -0.0354  -0.1074 
-8 -0.0716  -0.1658 0.2126 > 0.1201 
-7 0.1791 > 0.0855 0.0274  -0.0336 
-6 -0.0151  0.1044 -0.1268  0.1127 
-5 -0.1385  -0.1485 0.1669  -0.0172 
-4 0.0569  0.1480 -0.0857  -0.0704 
-3 0.0511  0.1052 -0.0368  0.0583 
-2 -0.0475  0.0958 0.1470 < 0.1701 
-1 0.2578 < 0.4053 -0.1330  -0.0453 
0 0.5126 << 0.7703 0.4284 << 0.6715 
1 0.4515 >> 0.4050 0.2489 >> -0.3751 
2 0.3669 >> -0.2302 -0.1296  0.0618 
3 -0.1578  0.1976 0.0929  0.1522 
4 -0.0168  -0.0079 0.0722 << 0.1550 
5 -0.1162  -0.0345 -0.0526  -0.0355 
6 -0.1133  -0.0236 -0.0563 << 0.1122 
7 -0.0534 >> -0.1374 0.0607  0.0935 
8 -0.1176  0.0078 -0.0568  -0.0183 
9 -0.0256 << 0.1283 0.1099  -0.0457 
10 0.0179  0.0686 -0.1377 << -0.0461 
The table presents the results of the trading interference hypothesis for the SPL and CB regimes as in 
equation 5. >> and > implies that the left hand figure is greater than the right hand figure at 0.01 and 
0.05 significance respectively using Wilcoxon signed-ranked test.  
 
3.4 Regulatory policies and volume-volatility relationship. 
In this section, I investigate the relationship between regulatory policies and volume-volatility 
dynamics. Corwin and Lipson (2000) find a higher volume of order submissions and 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
movements are expected post halts. Greenwald and Stein (1988) claim that these large price movements are not a 
cause for concern as long as there are no asymmetries of information between the traders and specialists. On the 
other hand, Fama (1989) argues that trading halts historically failed to cool markets down and to decrease price 
volatility. In contrast, volatility is found to be higher under such halts (Lee, Ready, and Seguin (1994). Fama also 
believes that all investors implement their own trading halts if they wish to analyse the disseminated information; 
these are called “homemade’’ trading halts.  
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cancellations around trading halts; this suggests that investors are trying to adjust their 
portfolios during the halt period. It is well documented that there is a positive relationship 
between trading volume and price volatility which is often explained by the Mixture of 
Distributions Hypothesis of Clark (1973), subsequently developed by Epps and Epps (1976) 
and Tauchen and Pitts (1983).  An alternative explanation is provided by the Sequential of 
Information Arrival hypothesis (SIAH) of Copeland (1976). To explore further the trading 
interference hypothesis, I run a cross-sectional regression – following Kim and Rhee (1997) - 
for the 21-day window separately for both upper and lower limits within the two regimes as in 
equation 7
20
.  
               jjjj
CBTAV   21 )(                                              (7) 
where: 
          
jV : Squared stock returns as a measure of price volatility. 
         
jTA : The percentage change of turnover ratio as a proxy of trading activity
21
. 
         j
CB : A dummy variable equals 1 for stocks that reach their upper or lower limits within 
the CB regime, and equals 0 within the SPL regime. 
According to the trading interference (TI) hypothesis, I expect a positive relationship between 
trading activity and price volatility during the 21-day window
22
. However, in day 0, I do not 
expect this relationship to continue, as price limits interfere with trading activity. The sign of 
the CB – dummy is expected to be positive and significant around event day. This implies an 
increase in price volatility due to regime switch from SPL to CB. Table 5 reports the results of 
the OLS regressions of equation 7.  
 
The models are well specified as the F stat. is highly significant and the adjusted R squared is 
reasonably high on event day. As expected, Table 5 reports a positive relationship between 
turnover ratio and volatility over the 21-day window for the upper and lower limits. However, 
this relationship is much stronger and highly significant around event day for the upper and 
lower limits.  
                                                          
20 I also controlled for company size (natural logarithm of market capitalization) and obtained similar results. I did 
not present this variable due to the correlation with turnover ratio. 
21
 I use the turnover ratio as a proxy for trading activity instead of trading volume per se as Farag and Cressy 
(2012) find that there is an endogeneity between trading volume and price volatility. 
22 I exclude the consecutive events for the sake of consistency with the volatility spillover hypothesis analysis. 
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Table 5 
 Volume- volatility relationship for the upper and lower limits  
Day Intercept CB TR Adj 
R2 
F.value Intercept CB TR Adj R2 F.value 
 
Panel A: Upper limits Panel B: Lower limits 
-10 
0.0013*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0004** 
(0.0002) 
0.00004 
(0.0001) 
0.007 2.645* 
0.0010*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0003* 
(0.0001) 
0.00003 
(0.0001) 
0.004 1.790 
-9 
0.0014*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0007*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0002* 
(0.0001) 
0.020 5.705*** 
0.0012*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0005*** 
(0.0002) 
0.00001 
(0.0001) 
0.014 3.480** 
-8 
0.0015*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0010*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0003*** 
(0.0001) 
0.077 19.54*** 
0.0010*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0003** 
(0.0001) 
0.0001* 
(0.0001) 
0.022 5.106*** 
-7 
0.0012*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0006*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0002** 
(0.0001) 
0.034 8.823*** 
0.0017*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0010*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0003* 
(0.0001) 
0.032 6.924*** 
-6 
0.0017*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0011*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0003 
(0.0002) 
0.056 14.14*** 
0.0019*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0013*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0001 
(0.0002) 
0.028 6.097*** 
-5 
0.0013*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0006*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0004*** 
(0.0001) 
0.024 6.427*** 
0.0014*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0008** 
(0.0003) 
0.00003 
(0.0001) 
0.011 2.925* 
-4 
0.0014*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0008*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0003** 
(0.0003) 
0.038 9.720*** 
0.0011*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0006*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0001 
(0.0001) 
0.029 6.244*** 
-3 
0.0140 
(0.0843) 
0.0834 
(0.1092) 
0.1182*** 
(0.0417) 
0.015 4.366** 
0.0038*** 
(0.0008) 
0.0032*** 
(0.0011) 
0.00004** 
(0.0002) 
0.017 4.107** 
-2 
0.0012*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0006*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0004** 
(0.0004) 
0.041 10.29*** 
0.0020*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0012*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0005** 
(0.0002) 
0.029 6.200*** 
-1 
0.0030*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0025*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0006*** 
(0.0001) 
0.167 45.36*** 
0.0054*** 
(0.0008) 
0.0046*** 
(0.0011) 
0.0004** 
(0.0002) 
0.041 8.479*** 
0 0.0177*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0152*** 
(0.0005) 
0.0002 
(0.0002) 
0.654 78.36*** 
0.0180*** 
(0.0005) 
0.0151*** 
(0.0007) 
-0.0002 
(0.0003) 
0.573 36.00*** 
1 
0.0037*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0024*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0004 
(0.0003) 
0.153 41.03*** 
0.0021*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0010*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0002 
(0.0002) 
0.041 8.506*** 
2 
0.0014*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0006*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0003*** 
(0.0001) 
0.016 4.662*** 
0.0023*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0016*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0002** 
(0.0001) 
0.072 14.51*** 
3 
0.0012*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0004*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0002*** 
(0.0001) 
0.028 7.363*** 
0.0018*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0010*** 
(0.0002) 
0.000** 
(0.0001) 
0.042 8.614*** 
4 
0.0016*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0008*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0002*** 
(0.0001) 
0.037 9.478*** 
0.0013*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0006*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0001* 
(0.0001) 
0.043 8.762*** 
5 
0.0014*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0005*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0002*** 
(0.0001) 
0.032 8.382*** 
0.0012*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0005** 
(0.0002) 
0.0001 
(0.0001) 
0.014 3.438** 
6 
0.0018*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0010*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0002** 
(0.0001) 
0.038 9.681*** 
0.0018*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0010*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0001 
(0.0001) 
0.028 5.949*** 
7 
0.0011*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0004** 
(0.0002) 
0.0001* 
(0.0001) 
0.015 4.451** 
0.0015*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0009*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0002 
(0.0002) 
0.016 4.125** 
8 
0.0017*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0011*** 
(0.0003) 
0.00002 
(0.0001) 
0.032 8.428*** 
0.0008*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0001 
(0.0001) 
0.0001 
(0.0001) 
-0.002 0.723 
9 
0.0014*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0008*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0003*** 
(0.0001) 
0.064 16.151*** 
0.0012*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0004** 
(0.0002) 
0.0002* 
(0.0001) 
0.013 3.371** 
10 
0.0012*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0004*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0001* 
(0.0001) 
0.021 5.815*** 
0.0013*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0006* 
(0.0003) 
0.0002 
(0.0001) 
0.0116 3.047** 
The table presents the results of the cross-sectional regression of equation 7. ***, **,* indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.  
 
Interestingly, I find an insignificant volume–volatility relationship on event day and on the 
first day post-event for both upper and lower limits. This suggests that price limits and circuit 
breakers disrupt trading activity. This result is consistent with the trading interference 
hypothesis. On the other hand, results show that the dummy variable (CB) is positive and 
highly significant for the upper and lower limits. This suggests that switching from SPL to CB 
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does increase volatility rather than cooling down the market as was intended. These findings 
are consistent with the volatility spillover hypothesis as regulatory policies (not trading 
activity) cause volatility to spread out over a few days post-limit hits. To support the analysis, 
I re-estimate Equation 4 using an augmented EGARCH model by controlling for trading 
volume as a regressor in the conditional variance equation and find positive and highly 
significant volume –volatility relationship23.  
 
4. Summary and conclusion 
I investigate the effect of regulatory policies (price limits and circuit breakers) on three 
main hypotheses, namely, volatility spillover, the delayed price discovery and the trading 
interference hypotheses in the Egyptian Stock Market (EGX).  
 
One of the compelling reasons for studying price limits in the context of the EGX is that it 
uniquely provides an example of the switch from strict price limits (SPL) to circuit breakers 
(CB).  I find that price limits do not decrease volatility as intended in both regimes (SPL and 
CB). However, volatility is found to be higher within the CB regime whereas, within the SPL 
regime, volatility is spread out over two days post-limit hit day. This result is consistent with 
the volatility spillover hypothesis (Kim and Rhee, 1997, Lee et al., 1994 and Chen et al., 2005). 
I also find that price continuation behaviour occurs more frequently within the SPL regime. 
However, price reversals seem to occur more frequently within the CB regime. This result is 
consistent with the delayed price discovery hypothesis as price limits prevent stock prices from 
reaching their equilibrium levels, in particular within the SPL regime. Moreover, I find a sharp 
increase in trading activity on event day for the two regimes. This result suggests that price 
limits interfere with trading activity and affect investors’ liquidity positions (Lehmann, 1989 
and Kim and Rhee, 1997). Finally, the results of the volume volatility relationship suggest that 
regulatory policies disrupt trading activity according to the trading interference hypothesis.  
 
To conclude, the above results show that switching from the SPL to the CB does increase price 
volatility in the Egyptian stock market. A potential interpretation of this result is as follows: 
price limits may prevent speculative traders from responding to the new information and 
                                                          
23
 Results are not presented but are available from the author upon request. 
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adjusting their portfolios. Within the SPL regime, traders are unable to obtain their desired 
positions on event day.  This implies that the price discovery mechanism is disrupted when 
stocks experience greater volatility for a few days post limit hits, therefore stock prices are 
prevented from reaching their equilibrium levels for few days post-event. These deviations 
from the true prices are expected to prevail within the SPL regime (Farag and Cressy, 2012).  
I claim that the price discovery mechanism in the Egyptian Stock Market varies between the 
SPL and CB regimes. Within the SPL, as prices hit the limit, trading is suspended until the end 
of the trading session, therefore volatility is expected to spread out over the following day(s), 
Meanwhile, investors have more time (until the following day) to analyse and to react to the 
new information, and then adjust their portfolios accordingly.  
 
On the other hand, within the CB regime, when prices hit the limits, trading is suspended for 30 
minutes. During this relatively short time investors have the chance to adjust their portfolios 
based on the new information arriving in the market (Farag and Cressy, 2012). However, due to 
the lack of informational efficiency in the Egyptian Stock Market not all investors are being 
provided with the new information. Therefore investors are unable to reveal their demand 
during the halt period. This suggests that stock prices are expected to be much noisier post halt 
period and significantly different from their equilibrium levels. I argue that since herding and 
noise trading are dominant behaviours in emerging markets, intense trading activity is expected 
to continue by some speculative traders when a trading session is resumed. Moreover, the 
media coverage plays an important role in affecting investors’ beliefs within a trading halt 
period (Lee et al., 1994). As a result, higher volume and volatility are expected when trading is 
resumed (Lee et al., 1994 and Farag and Cressy, 2011).  
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